FIXED-WING = LONG LOITER TIMES OVERHEAD FRIENDLY TROOPS
"'Fast moving aircraft are not designed to support ground troops," said Army Sgt. First Class Frank Antenori. 'As much as the Air Force and Navy would like to think that, fighter aircraft that travel at speeds can't slow down to identify the targets,' he told National Defense...
He said the Air Force A-10 attack plane and the Army Apache helicopter are the ideal platforms for close air support, best suited to SOF missions. Air Force F-16s and Navy F/A-18s are much too fast to be able to properly identify targets, he said. 'The problem is getting the pilots at the altitudes and speeds that they are flying to be able to ID the targets,' he said.
A-10s and Apaches do a much better job, because they can move at a slower speed. 'With fast movers, I never had any success,' he said."
"Fast Jets Not Ideal Choice for Close Air Support" by Roxana Tiron, National Defense magazine, April 2004
Arizona Republic (Phoenix)April 3, 2007
Peril To Forces Called Cause Of Crash [WRONG: it was WRONG type of aircraft]
By Charles Kelly, The Arizona Republic
Maj. Troy "Trojan" Gilbert, a Luke Air Force Base fighter pilot killed in Iraq on Nov. 27, crashed because he was so focused on saving friendly troops from insurgents that he flew too low, Air Force officials have concluded. Gilbert, 34, of the Litchfield Park area, was trying to head off an attack by insurgents on ground troops and the crew of a downed Army helicopter 20 miles northwest of Baghdad.
At the time, Gilbert was leading a flight of two F-16 fighter-bombers near Taji, according to an Air Force accident investigation board report. He responded when insurgents attacked troops on the ground with truck-mounted heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, small-arms fire and mortars. Gilbert carried out one strafing run against the enemy vehicles, striking a truck with his 20mm Gatling gun before pulling out only 200 feet from the ground, said the head of the accident investigation board, Brig. Gen. David L. Goldfein.
Gilbert flew even lower on his second strafing run and was unable to pull up before he crashed, Goldfein said. Investigators concluded that he died instantly.
His actions helped save the lives of the helicopter crew and other coalition ground forces, Goldfein said. Gilbert was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross with Valor.[And the USAF-fighter-bombers-for-everything bureaucracy continues operating the wrong type aircraft lest their ego platforms have to share the budgetary limelight with slower, more agile armored aircraft like the A-10 suitable to the job].
He chose to attack at a very low altitude because he was concerned about making sure he was correctly identifying enemy vehicles trying to merge with civilian vehicles, Goldfein said. Gilbert attacked from a difficult angle because he apparently wanted to bring fire on the enemy vehicles quickly to protect the ground troops, who were in a very perilous situation.
Gilbert's remains were removed from the crashed plane before coalition forces could get there. An intensive search was immediately conducted without result. Coalition forces are still working to find Gilbert's remains and return them to his family, Goldfein said.
The U.S. military nation-state war racketeers do not want to change and do sub-national conflict tasks properly with proper equipment to resolve an allegedly "long war" they want to keep on milking for years and years. They need to be fired by WE THE PEOPLE and replaced by people representing us FROM US ie: the all-victim-force (AVF) must be ended and replaced with a broad form of national service where non-racketeers run the services.
www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/15/opinion/edpllizzari.php
Repeating Soviet mistakesValerio Pellizzari
Published: March 15, 2007ROME: A few weeks ago a young military spokesman representing Italian Coalition forces in Afghanistan was summarily relieved of his duties after commenting that Italian Soldiers were building a Roman Catholic church in Herat dedicated to the Virgin Mary, whose religious importance he termed, "spiritually meaningful to Muslims too."
A careful reading of the Koran might have made him feel otherwise. Moreover, it might have helped had he known that only one church has ever been allowed on Afghan soil. It was authorized by King Amanullah and built in 1933 in gratitude for Italy's being among the first countries to recognize Afghan independence. However, there are worse misunderstandings in Afghanistan, the worst being that senior NATO officials at their Brussels headquarters don't seem to grasp that they are repeating the same tragic mistakes made by Kremlin generals 25 years ago. NATO today, like Moscow a generation ago, has opted to increase spending to conduct aerial warfare, thereby intending to reduce military fatalities on the ground, maintain relative control of communications networks and at least pretend to control the country. The strategy isn't working.
The Italian government, for one, doesn't seem to understand this either. Italy's transformation last summer, from the government of Silvio Berlusconi to that of Romano Prodi, occasioned a hectic domestic debate over Afghanistan. Everybody important weighed in, even though Afghanistan had been ignored by Italians for years. Except for Dr. Alberto Cairo, with the International Red Cross, and Dr. Gino Strada with the organization Emergency, few Italians are associated with the country. Unfortunately, the discussion ignored the most important problem in fighting the war, the mistake of maintaining strategic dependence on aerial warfare. Debate centered instead on less-vital issues, like stopping the growing drug traffic, re-establishing the judicial system and building respect for democratic principles.
From June until November, 2006, NATO carried out roughly 2,100 aerial bombing missions there, an average of 18 daily missions, with some bombs weighing close to 2000 pounds. There was nothing cosmetic about this sustained, massive bombardment. However, during this same period, attacks by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and others opposed to President Hamid Karzai increased. The number of suicide bombers also rose. This made 2006 the bloodiest year in Afghanistan since the defeat of Mullah Omar and the Taliban in 2001.
NATO's aerial war has been ineffective. Relying so heavily on air attacks to keep fatalities low is simply repeating the same mistake that the Russians made in Afghanistan a generation ago. The most stunning example was the futile battle of Tora Bora to capture Osama bin Laden at the end of 2001. As Jonathan Randal writes in his book, "Osama," coalition troops did not fight on the ground at Tora Bora. It wasn't a battle at all, just a hail of missiles and bombs that came and went.
Even ignoring the basic tenet of military strategy that having ample numbers of ground troops is vital, other signs that strategic vision is lacking abound. It's not just the Italians who benightedly decide to build a Catholic church in an Islamic country at war. It's also the Americans, whose management of Kabul seems befuddled. For one thing, to protect their embassy in Kabul, the Americans have declared the whole city center off-limits to Afghanis, destroying any chance for normalcy there.
I asked Edmund McWilliams, who was in charge of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in the late 1980s, about this. He confirmed that life under the doomed Soviet occupation wasn't much different than it is today. There was a nightly curfew back then, when the KGB worked out of the same headquarters that the CIA uses now. The Communist president, Mohammad Najibullah, used to shut down air traffic for hours whenever he flew anywhere, just like Karzai does now. The Kabul sky teemed with armored helicopters and Mig fighters. Nevertheless, the Russians eventually were obliged to withdraw.
They even bribed the guerrillas to avoid being attacked while retreating over the Salang Pass. The arrangement was made through channels of communication easily as mysterious as anything that Rudyard Kipling describes in "Kim." Still, news of the deal leaked out a week before the withdrawal.
Secrets don't exist in Afghanistan. Note how a suicide bomber was ready to strike recently at the Bagram air base after Vice President Dick Cheney landed there, with no evident advance notice of his visit given. Just one generation after the failed Soviet example, the Western presence in Afghanistan is tilting towards chaos, largely because the lessons of history, culture and modern warfare are being ignored.
Valerio Pellizzari is a special correspondent for Il Messaggero in Rome. He is the author of books on Afghanistan and the war in Iraq.
1. These are yet more reasons why the immature nation-state war Soldier/marine should not be tasked to do sub-national conflicts and why we need a NLB-SC composed of psychologically-screened, older more mature Soldiers.
www.combatreform2.com/johnpaulvann.htm
The nation-state war racketeers don't want a properly trained/equipped NLB-SC because it may be the only "action" to justify their budgets and they certainly are not going to let someone else get the missions regardless of how unqualified they are to do them.
2. Another series of tragedies showing why we need low-altitude MANNED observation/attack aircraft with discretionary firepower to control the ground below 24/7/365 not sexy fighter-bombers that can't see what they are dropping and have to have their hands held by a GFAC on the ground below.
www.geocities.com/usarmyaviationdigest/grasshoppersmustreturn.htm
SRA, Aerial Car Bombs
By Carlton Meyer
Mar/20/2007Youtube.com has become one of the world's most popular websites in less than a year. It allows anyone to easily upload home-made videos for everyone to view -- all for free. This is an example of America's "new economy" because it loses millions of dollars a month with no real plan of how to make it profitable. Meanwhile, youtube and other new video databases have changed the way information can be presented over the Internet.
If a picture is worth a thousand words, a video is worth millions. Just a few video clips provide excellent examples of how the U.S. military failed in Iraq. Numerous stories have appeared in the press about U.S. Soldiers and marines slaughtering innocents. However, the most common method occurs when large aerial bombs are dropped on Iraqi cities. While the corporate media provides daily reports of civilians killed by car bombs, they rarely mention civilians killed by U.S. military bombs.
Here is a youtube clip of U.S. troops dealing with a sniper in a major city.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iq8oZ7_Z8pg
That blast was as powerful as any car bomb, and U.S. troops certainly didn't inspect the building beforehand to ensure it was not occupied by civilians. The audio is equally frighting as it shows immature soldiers laughing and cheering at the massive destruction, like teenagers enjoying fireworks. How would you like those yahoos rooting out insurgents in your neighborhood?
The Iraqi city of Ramadi has proven tough to pacify. Here are American "peacekeepers" exploding 2000 lb. bombs on its inhabitants.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_Lcjfdra2c&mode=related&search=
Here are two more recent examples of gratuitous death and destruction in Iraqi cities:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=MbE42svaMjM&mode=related&search=
www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGC5LmjVDIA&mode=related&search=Search youtube to find more. These are just incidents that were videotaped and uploaded at youtube. Such crimes occur daily in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and helps explain "why they hate us." Youtube allows viewers to comment, which provides frightening examples of the hatred many Americans have toward everyone. They don't care if innocent people are killed; they think it funny. While billions of dollars are spent each month to rebuild these nations, aerial bomb attacks probably destroy more each day than is rebuilt.
Some may claim these incidents are the result of some immature junior enlisted personnel. Daily evidence proves otherwise. The U.S. Central Command proudly posts its daily "airpower" summary on the Internet. Here is part of the March 7th summary:
------------------------------------------
SOUTHWEST ASIA - In Afghanistan yesterday, .... Also near Sangin, U.S. Navy F/A-18s received coordinates for a compound where enemy fire was originating. One of the F/A-18s dropped a Guided Bomb Unit-12 on the compound. A JTAC reported a good hit with an unusually large initial explosion and at least ten secondary explosions, possibly indicating destruction of a weapons cache. Other U.S. Navy F/A-18s dropped GBU-12s and GBU-38s on two separate anti-Coalition insurgent buildings near Sangin. All weapons hit the desired target as confirmed by a JTAC. Other F/A-18s also dropped GBU-12s and GBU-38s on enemies in a wooded area and another enemy building near Sangin. Royal Air Force GR-7 Harriers released Enhanced Paveway II munitions and a 540 pound bomb on enemy trench systems near Kajaki Dam. The weapons directly hit the targets according to a JTAC. French Air Force M2000s provided a show of force for Coalition forces receiving rocket fire near Now Zad. In total, 54 close air support missions were flown in support of the International Security Assistance Force and Afghan troops, reconstruction activities and route patrols.[1]
-----------------------------------------
As a result of one of these actions, the media reported that nine civilians, including four children, were killed in Afghanistan when U.S. warplanes dropped two 2,000 lb. bombs on their mud home. The Central Command attempted to justify these murders: "Coalition forces observed two men with AK-47s [assault rifles] leaving the scene of the rocket attack and entering the compound," said Lt-Col David Accetta, a military spokesman. "These men knowingly endangered civilians by retreating into a populated area while conducting attacks against coalition forces." The "compound" was a small group of mud houses where a family lived.[2]
In this case, a single rocket was fired at an American airbase and caused no damage. Two men with rifles were seen near the area where the rocket was launched. The two disappeared into a small group of mud huts. It is not uncommon for Afghan men to carry rifles, yet they may have been responsible for launching that harassing rocket. A rational commander may dispatch a squad of soldiers to search the mud huts and question the men. However, some deranged Americans decided to drop bombs on the mud huts where civilians lived.
Even more shocking was evidence of approval by senior American military officers provided by their spokesman. He did not apologize and and state that an investigation was underway and criminal charges are likely to be filed. He blamed the two Afghans with rifles for the civilian deaths, men whom he was not even sure were responsible for launching a small rocket. Even if they were, they did not kill the nine civilians, some in the U.S. military murdered them. This was not part of a firefight and no U.S. servicemen were in danger, so what did they think would happened when they dropped two huge bombs on a group of mud huts where civilians lived?
This is not only inexcusable, but criminal. This was a widely reported story, yet there was no outrage by members of congress, no editorials demanding an investigation, and no military officers relieved of command. This is why such outrageous acts continue, and why the insurgency continues to grow in both Iraq and Afghanistan as friends, relatives, and sympathetic Muslims join in the fight against American "peacekeepers."
The U.S. Military has a justice system to punish people who kill others, even by accident. The Central Command's website provides a recent news release about a junior enlisted Soldier convicted of negligent homicide and sent to prison:
--------------------------------------------
Specialist Daniel E. Turner, C Battery 1/142 Field Artillery, 16th MP BDE, was convicted at a general court-martial Feb. 26 for negligent homicide and dereliction of duty. In the early morning hours of July 20, 2006, Turner shot and killed a fellow Soldier while clearing his M9 pistol. Turner was culpably negligent in failing to ensure his weapon was safe and in failing to ensure he safely cleared his weapon. The court martial was tried at Camp Victory, Iraq, presided over by military judge, Col. James Pohl of the 5th Judicial Circuit based in Germany. The court-martial panel sentenced Turner to confinement for 15 months, reduction to the grade of E-1, total forfeitures of pay and allowances, and a bad conduct discharge.[3]
---------------------------------------------
This was clearly an accident, but killing an American results in prison time. However, when Americans recklessly kill Afghans and Iraqis, it is always the victims fault for living where a bomb was dropped. This arrogance is why the U.S. military has lost. _____________________________________________
[1] "Airpower Summary for March 6"; U.S. Central Command; March 7, 2007.
[2] "Afghan children die as US drops one-tonne bombs"; The Independent ; March 6, 2007.
[3] "News Release "; U.S. Central Command; Feb. 27, 2007.
Jet Fighter-Bomber Madness: Mustangs, Twin Mustangs, Corsairs and SkyRaiders Save the Day in Korea and later in Vietnam, too: what do we have now to do the same today?
One benefit of a fixed-wing attack U/MCAV Killer Bee is that they can fly with greater weapon loads for longer periods of time than either fast jets or slow helicopters since they require less power to remain aloft and thus burn less fuel because their props only need to keep the aircraft moving forward for air flowing over fixed wings while helicopters with rotary wings must keep their entire wing area spinning to create their own lift.
This is not a new revelation! However its a reality of planet earth physics that egotistical fighter-bomber jet jocks do not want to admit: that some missions like finding hiding enemies are best done using simpler, slower fixed-wing aircraft at lower altitudes, and the rotorheads don't want to admit that slow, loud mechanically complex helicopters with short ranges are not best, either.
How did we get into this too-fast-with-jets, too-slow-with-helicopters Mess?
Eseentially all the U.S. military services are run by self-worship narcissism. Egomaniacs don't want to admit they have any limitations on their path first paved by Nimrod to Tower of Babel ruin to become "gods". Narcissists don't admit that The Battle Against The Earth (TBATE) is the first military foe and you can see this repeatedly reading about constant pilot-error and engine and airframe created aircraft crashes in the U.S. Naval Aviation News "Granpaw Pettibone" section. This man worshipping hubris has over the years extended to aircraft designs which have become more and more mechanically complex making aircraft less able to beat TBATE to even make it into the air and makes them prone to mechanical failures and crashes.
As costs increase with complexity, we get Spinney's "death spiral" where we can buy less and less aircraft until we are out of the air force business entirely, which is where Army and marine ground forces are now today: they do not have 24/7/365 air cover looking out for the enemy below them today in Iraq/Afghanistan. Flying model airplane UAVs with a 50% crash rate and can't see with any near the fidelity of human eyes from aircraft overhead that can investigate has not worked around corporate greed and pilot ego to effect maneuver air support (MAS). The men on the ground getting blown up by landmines are full of their own pride and egotism and don't want to admit they need help from the air, least of all the insufferable pilot egomaniacs and look down on their own fallibility and think they don't need armored tracks and insist on riding in rubber-tired wheeled trucks so they don't look like a "mech pussy" but damn themselves to roads/trails where the enemy free to lay landmines at will awaits to press the detonator.
Aviation legend and war futurist, Chuck Myers recently concluded that in times of peace folks are just pre-disposed towards flying faster and higher with the excuse that they are to shoot down mythical Soviet air force MIG fleets rather than focus on wars on the ground which are ugly. So without a war to keep the U.S. military focused, it tends to want to be a "NASA in military colors". Certainly TBATE is funner and less dangerous than TBATE + The Battle Against Man (TBAM). However, if you are going to lick TBATE, lick it with SAFER aircraft designs like our LARA 2 proposals in the previous Killerbees 2 web page ie; have HUMILITY not hubris.
Leading up to the Korean war, the advent of jet engine propulsion creates a growing trend to fly higher and higher above the battlefield and requiring longer and longer runways so while both in the air and on the ground the flyboys are further and further distant from the ground force underclass. These runways whether on land or at sea are easily detected and attacked by enemies.
Consider the silly non-sense hubris leading up to the Korean War about "jets doing it all" as seen in U.S. Naval Aviation News August, 1950 pages 9, 10 and 11:
Bring back the Prop planes! Korean War Reality Check: Jets Fail, Props Save our troops on the Ground: We go with Less Than Optimal Aircraft
Just a few weeks after this jets-can-do-everything crap was printed the Korean war broke out and the jet pilots couldn't see shit diving in at 600 mph...
...and only because we had left-over WW2 prop attack planes that we were able to stop our ill-prepared foot-infantry ground troops from being over-run.
Bring back the Ground Forward Air Controllers (GFACs)!
F-4U/AU-1 Corsair
The Corsair was designed by Igor Sikorsky in the 1930s to shoot down other airplanes by the maximum speed possible from the largest engine possible.
BEFORE
AFTER
This caused them to bend the wings to lower the landing gear for a huge prop, but they placed dangerous fuel tanks in front of the pilot making for a long nose making it difficult to see during taxiing and landing. With massive torque the Corsair's left wing would drop suddenly when coming in to land causing all that volatile aviation gasoline to burst into flames. Difficult to fly, but able to carry more ordnance than the easier-to-fly Hellcat which was used to shoot down more Jap planes in WW2, the Corsair outlived the former which was replaced by jets to do the fighter role. Able to take-off in 360 feet, the Corsair was able to operate from dirt strips to do ground attacks using its landing gear as dive brakes.
The Corsair was a less-than-ideal attack plane since it really was a prop plane air superiority fighter to shoot Jap Zeros that was only kept around as a second class citizen doing ground attack because of the insistence of WW2 ground troops. Ditto this for the P-51 Mustang. Greg Goebel writes about P-51s in the desperate days in Korea:
Although the F-82G served an important role in the first few weeks of the Korean conflict, it faded into the background once the U.S. arrived in real force. In contrast, the old P-51D, by then redesignated "F-51D", was a star player through the first year of the war, back in the original Mustang assignment of "mudfighter".After the end of WW II, piston-engine fighters were rapidly phased out of front-line service in favor of new jet fighters, such as the P-80 Shooting Star. The USAAF retained a few squadrons of P-51Hs, but the older P-51Ds were passed on to the Air National Guard (ANG). As late as 1952, the ANG would still have 68 squadrons flying the Mustang, though the last of them would be gone in 1957.
Most of the remaining Mustangs were either sold to foreign operators or scrapped. In the early summer of 1950, the USAF had three fighter groups operating in Japan that had converted from the F-51D to the F-80, and the old F-51Ds were sitting in storage, waiting to be scrapped. When the war broke out on 25 June, the USAF realized that the F-51Ds were what was needed to help stem the North Korean offensive. The North Koreans, as noted, had no advanced aircraft, and the F-51D had better endurance and warload than the F-80, though some Air Force officers worried with good reason about the Mustang's well-known vulnerability to ground fire. The P-51D could also operate more effectively than jets from primitive airfields. The three fighter groups traded their F-80s back in for their old F-51Ds and were thrown into the battle.
The USAF also grabbed 145 F-51Ds from ANG units and rushed them to Japan on the carrier USS BOXER, which arrived in Tokyo on 23 July 1950. Two squadrons were equipped with the new arrivals, and were quickly flying dozens of sorties a day from rough airstrips behind the front lines in Korea. A squadron each of Mustangs was provided by Australia and South Africa. F-51Ds were also supplied to the South Koreans. The Mustangs struck at enemy columns with machine guns, bombs, HVARs, and napalm. Since the bombs and rockets were not particularly accurate, napalm was the preferred weapon for attacking formidable North Korean T-34 tanks, since a napalm bomb saturated a wide area with fire. The attacks were made at low level, however, and Mustang attrition was high. The notorious vulnerability of the Mustang's cooling system was a particular problem. Some thought was in fact given to fielding a squadron of Republic F-47N Thunderbolts, which were better close-support aircraft, but the aircraft were simply not available.
By the fall of 1950, the North Koreans were on the run, and the Americans and their allies were pursuing them into North Korea. Mustangs ranged freely with little air opposition. They claimed five kills during this time, their only air combat victories of the war.
In early November, Mustangs began to encounter fast-jet MiG-15s, and it was only due to the skill of the Mustang pilots and the inexperience of the enemy that the F-51Ds were able to survive. By the time cold weather set in, Chinese forces were pouring into North Korea, driving the Americans and their allies south in a fast retreat that stopped at the South Korean border. The front lines stabilized there and a static war of attrition followed.
With the USAF countering the MiG-15 with the North American F-86, the air combat environment became increasingly too dangerous for piston engine fighters like the F-51D. Most units equipped with the Mustang converted to jets, and by the end of the war in July 1953, only one USAF squadron and some South Korean units were operating the Mustang.
A total of 194 F-51Ds were lost in the war. 172 were destroyed by ground fire, 10 were shot down by enemy aircraft, and 12 were lost to unreported causes.
The SkyRaider was much safer to fly than the Corsair, and far sturdier than the Mustang and could lift more ordnance but it was originally a ship "killer bee" to operate in swarms to sink Jap ships. With no nation-state war Air Force and navies with convenient target patsies comparable to their speeds, they were sent in do ground attack with inadequate armoring and dangerous aviation gasoline as their fuels. Some may ask, WHERE DID ALL THE STURDY ATTACK P-47s GO? (they were given away to friendly air forces).
Corsairs, SkyRaiders and Thunderbolts all used fat air-cooled, radial piston engines which offer a lot of frontal drag and burn a tremendous amount of fuel to create thrust to get their speed. This "brute force" approach made them all gas hogs, hence they had to carry more fuel to get the same ranges a fuel-sipping less frontal drag P-51 could achieve with a liquid-cooled inline engine. Huge amounts of fuel in the airplane make it vulnerable to fire/explosion if hit by enemy fire and as seen in the Corsair compromise the design to ruin pilot visibility by long noses of an already difficult to control machine.
ALL of these single props driven by huge amounts of horsepower have torque problems that can kill pilots on landing and take-offs. The Navy began to try to contraprop piston engined planes to solve this pilot-killing problem starting in WW2. The jet jocks conveniently did not let this problem get solved by contraprops to keep their competitors down and eventually to force them out of the service.
The British and Russians could figure out how to make reliable contraprop powerplants, but we Americans "gave up" after only one try with the Allison XT40 in the 1950s. We could have placed the Gannet's contraprop engine powerplant into P-51s and/or SkyRaiders so we have no excuse.
During WW2, the navy tried P-51s on aircraft carriers and found they were suitable but did not employ them having already invested too much ego and $ in their air-cooled gas hogs. Another downside of fuel hungry planes is that more fuel in the aircraft carrier compromises its safety in event of air attacks. In retrospect, had the Navy and Army/AF cooperated on a joint navalized P-51 as an ATTACK PLANE they could have ARMORED IT so its vulnerable inline engine would not make it easy to shoot down. We could have entered WW2 with a contraprop turbine-engined P-51 (with perhaps an emergency jet engine in the tail) HAD WE VALUED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT and not been off zooming into the "Wild Blue Yonder" with jets.
It would have been...the Piper PA-48 Enforcer 20 years before it arrived 20 years too late. Greg Goebel writes:
Even in the 1960s, there were those who felt the Mustang still had plenty of potential. One of these was David B. Lindsey JR, who established a company named Trans-Florida Aviation, which rebuilt several Mustangs into a two-seat "executive transport" named the "Cavalier". The Cavalier Mustang attracted enough attention to lead Lindsey to rename his company "Cavalier Aircraft Corporation" in 1962, and acquired the Mustang type certificate and tradename from North American.The Cavalier Mustang was available in a range of versions, including the "750", "1200", "1500", "2000", and "2500". They were all very similar, the main difference between the variants being an increase in fuel capacity up the numbering sequence, with the Cavalier 2000 and 2500 adding fixed wingtip tanks with a capacity of 416.5 liters (110 U.S. gallons) each. Cavalier also appears to have fitted out aircraft as per user request, making most of them custom jobs to a degree.
In 1967, Cavalier developed an updated Mustang for the counter-insurgency (COIN) role. The "Cavalier Mustang II" was a rebuilt P-51D, with a new Packard Merlin V-1650-7 engine; improved avionics; the taller tailfin used on the F-51H; fixed wingtip fuel tanks as per the Cavalier 2000 and 2500; and a reinforced wing to support a total of eight stores pylons, permitting a total stores load of 1.8 tonnes (4,000 pounds). It also featured a second seat for an observer behind the pilot. Images of Mustang IIs seem to show that they had a canopy with a bulge in the rear to provide headroom for the back-seater, but it is unclear if this was a standard fit.
As with the Cavalier Mustang, the company seems to have manufactured a number of variations on the Mustang II, building them with such features as required by a specific order. It is also not clear if they were all actually referred to as "Mustang Iis", but since the matter is both complicated and not very interesting, all the Cavalier military Mustang conversions are referred to by that name here for simplicity.
That same year, 1967, the USAF ordered a batch of Mustang Iis for delivery to friendly Latin American and Asian nations under the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP). The next year, 1968, the U.S. Army ordered two more Mustang Iis as chase aircraft for the YAH-56 Cheyenne helicopter gunship program, and used them in short-lived experiments in close-support applications after the Cheyenne program was cancelled. The USAF ordered a second batch of Mustang Iis for MAP in 1972.
In 1968, Cavalier fitted a Mustang with a Rolls-Royce Dart 510 turboprop with 1,245 ekW (1,670 eHP), calling the modified machine the "Cavalier Turbo Mustang III". Cavalier tried to sell the concept to the Air Force, but the service wasn't interested. Cavalier then sold the Turbo Mustang III to Piper Aircraft and transferred the technology base for the work along with it. The Turbo Mustang III was delivered to Piper in November 1970.
The USAF was interested in a more formidable COIN aircraft for supply to U.S. allies under MAP, and had initiated a program named "Pave Coin" to evaluate such a machine. Piper felt that a turboprop Mustang would fit the requirement, and converted an F-51D and a TF-51D to a configuration with a Lycoming T55-L-9 turboprop engine, with 1,830 kW (2,455 SHP). Piper gave the up-engined machines the name of "Enforcer", and the first flew on 19 April 1971. The USAF evaluated one of them, but had cooled to the program and the evaluation led nowhere. However, Congress was very interested in a relatively low-cost close-support aircraft, and pressured the Air Force to award a contract for two "PA-48 Enforcer" prototypes in September 1981. The two PA-48s were also powered by the Lycoming T55-L-9 turboprop, but they were not only completely new-build machines, they were almost entirely new designs.
The PA-48s were clearly members of the Mustang family, but they were also clearly bigger and meaner looking. They were 38 centimeters (15 inches) longer, with a bigger tail and a four-bladed paddle propeller; were fitted with plastic armor and self-sealing tanks; and their wings bristled with a total of ten stores pylons. There was also provision for wingtip fuel tanks. They did not have any built-in armament, the plan being that they would carry underwing gun pods instead, and had an ejection seat.
Both the Navy and AF had the Fireball/Dark Shark and XP-81 programs showing them new designs that could have done ground attack but they were both fixated on air duels faster and higher. There's no "ace" and "top gun" glory in ground attack.
Since we can't find/hit the enemy maneuvering against our troops (Close Air Support) in close proximity with jets or naval helicopters we use WW2 prop planes, and have the jets hit obvious targets like bridges and rail yards (interdiction). The Navy didn't realize switching their SC-1/2 SeaHawk fixed-wing observation/attack planes for slow and short-range helicopters was a huge mistake and/or wanted to undermine their cruiser/battleship gunnery to prop up their aircraft carrier mentality. The Royal Navy didn't mind where their air gunfire spotter help came from and kicked ass as the story below reveals:
When the less-than-ideal WW2 prop planes began to get shot down, we realized bailing out would no longer suffice and began to field ejection seats--for jets first of course! We began to add armor, drop survival gear to downed pilots, and rescue them by helicopters and STOL grasshoppers fixed-wing planes...
However, a lot of them were shot down in absurd dark blue paint schemes and inadequate armoring. The Navy/marines never realized their camouflage was bad but they did try to improve the armor in the AU-1 version they bought.
Even though the AU-1 was greatly armored, the Corsair was an "Ensign Eliminator" and killed almost as many of its pilots as it did the enemy, which is one of the perils of taking a plane designed for one thing and trying to make do with it for something else. The Corsair pilot did have an ability to look down at the ground at targets at the gull juncture without having to bank the entire plane;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F4U_Corsair
"A straight, low-wing design would have blocked most of the visibility from the cockpit toward the ground while in level flight, but a Corsair pilot could look through a 'notch' and get a better ground reference without having to bank one way or the other to move the wing out of the way."
However, the Corsair did not have a back-seat co-pilot/observer to prevent flying into the ground from target fixation or just to ease the work-load of looking for the enemy on the ground and MIGs in the air and flying the temperamental plane.
AD-1 SkyRaider
Heinneman's SkyRaider was designed as a dive and torpedo bomber drawing from lessons learned from the WW2 planes. Though still using highly dangerous avgas, the fuel tank was armored and BEHIND the pilot. The pilot was in a 360 degree bubble canopy well forward of the wing to see ahead for targets and to land safely. Later models had armor after a lot of Korean shoot-downs made it obvious...
Final models even had ejection seats to escape at low-altitudes without fumbling with canopies that refuse to jettison which plagued the Corsairs.
Still having torque problems, a contra-rotating turbine engine version was considered but given up on by the anti-prop plane fighter jet mafia causing production to end in 1957. Most SkyRaiders did not have a back-seat co-pilot/observer to prevent flying into the ground from target fixation or just to ease the work-load of looking for the enemy on the ground and MIGs in the air.
Target Fixation: Fatal for Single-Seat Piloted Aircraft
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbKLB7xNWhs
The mighty SkyRaider soldiered on through the Vietnam war reaching a legendary reputation for killing the enemy and not its own pilots. Unlike the Corsair, some models had ejection seats to prevent having to climb out of a cockpit of an out-of-control plane and not get blown back into the tail. Its too bad that the SkyShark was not perfected to solve the torque and volatile fuel problems so we'd have a suitable MAS O/A aircraft and naval gunfire spotter and multi-purpose seaplane today.
Bring Back Airborne Forward Air Controllers (AFACs)
So we grudgingly knew even back in the '50s during the Korean War that most jets fly too fast and helicopters not fast and long enough! Before the advent of jets, we had STOL "Grasshoppers" that acted as Airborne Forward Air Controllers (AFACs) for artillery fires or prop-plane P-47 and other USAAF fighter-bombers. The Grasshoppers could be co-located with ground maneuver units because they could take off and land off grassy fields and roads or be moved by trucks!
Our first stab at a AFAC for jet and single-seat prop fighter-bombers was using the AT-6 "Mosquito".
T-6 "Mosquitoes" in Korea
Image Size: 13" x 24" 600 Public Edition (Limited Edition, Signed and Numbered) 100 Publisher Proof Edition (Limited Edition, Signed and Numbered) 100 Artist Proof Edition (Limited Edition, Signed and Numbered)
The 6147th Tactical Control Group, nicknamed the "Mosquitoes", received a Presidential citation in 1951 for their performance in the Korean War. This citation was for the entire unit and without parallel in aerial warfare history at that time. The gallant Mosquito pilots flew unarmed and unescorted T-6 aircraft that were vulnerable to opposition from the air and ground. Yet these brave pilots flew at dangerously low altitudes over Communist positions searching for telltale signs of the enemies presence: freshly turned earth, footprints in the snow or a discarded tin can. Once a sign was spotted, the Mosquitoes flew down into the flak and marked their targets with smoke rockets. The North Koreans called them "Mosquitoes" because the sight of a North American T-6 buzzing down on them meant they were soon to be "stung". Shortly after the annoying buzz of the venerable Texan ceased, the screams of rocket-laden P-51 Mustangs or the new jet fighter, F-84 Thunderstreak, were on their way downhill to deliver death and destruction to the Communist supply lines. The T-6 tactical coordinators of the 6147th Tactical Control Group may have been "old and outdated", but as deadly hunting dogs that pinpointed game for heavily armed aerial hunters, they were universally feared by the enemy.
The speed of the fast fighter/bombers, particularly the jets, did not allow the pilots to adequately see and target the highly camouflaged positions and vehicles of the North Koreans. They needed small, slow yet maneuverable aircraft with an observer who could mark the enemy positions with smoke bombs or rockets. The T-6 was fast enough to evade enemy attacks, had adequate visibility to truly observe targets, could be equipped with the necessary communications gear (eight-channel AN/ARC3 radio sets) to talk the fighter/bombers into targets and could carry target rockets to mark sites. The men called to fly these missions lived a kind of gypsy life, they were moved from air base to airbase as the U.N. forces retreated southward from the North Korean flood. They were quite literally "Out On A Limb", not only needing to complete their operational objectives in the air, but also having to leave the ground staff of the group to move all their equipment to the next airfield down the line. We have largely forgotten the role of these daredevils in the T-6, but without the "Mosquitoes" - a raging outfit of professionals of one stripe or another - the Korean air war might have been a different story. By the end of the Korean War, the 6147th Tactical Control Group lost 42 aircraft and 33 men. The Mosquitoes flew over 40,000 sorties aiding in the destruction of 5 tank divisions, 563 artillery pieces, 5,079 vehicles, 12 locomotives, and 84 bridges.
However, as soon as Korea ended the fast jet fighter-bomber panacea BS started up again and the grasshoppers were retired in the USAF. The navy and marines ditched their crash-prone Corsairs and grudgingly kept operating SkyRaiders until they could find a sexy jet attack plane replacement. Only the U.S. Army and marines realized the need for MAS grasshopper type observation aircraft, but as you will see, they had begun home growing their own fighter pilot egotists and a new type of egomaniac: the rotorhead-for-everything idiot. In a few short years both of them would have these mini-ego clubs retired their OV-1s and OV-10s, leaving us to the current state we are in today, without continuous overhead presence maneuver air support which has cost us thousands of dead and wounded in Iraq/Afghanistan.
Korean War Aftermath: The enemy did not sleep. He got better at camouflage while we chose to not look by flying "higher and faster"
Realizing that in the bare hills of Korea he would be exposed, the enemy turned to camouflage and night operations to evade our aircraft. These lessons were passed on to the Vietnamese who with better closed terrain with foilage offering concealment began to defeat our WW2-style of warfare starting in the first IndoChina war and succeeding at Dien Bien Phu. These events should have made the U.S. MICC-TT wake up and change course from their "higher and faster" push-button war fixation, but as events sadly turned out, did not resulting in our tactical and operational defeat in the second IndoChina war (Vietnam War).
Other Allied Air Forces Realize they Need Prop Observation/Attack Planes
While the U.S. was on an orgy of MICC-TT speed and altitude projects, other nation's with real threats facing them TODAY obtained effective solutions from us that were no longer in vogue like P-47s, SkyRaiders and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (AAMs). The Taiwanese shoot down some higher flying MIG-15s from their lower altitude limited F-86s, marking a first in air combat.
Meanwhile, the South Vietnamese get SkyRaiders for their war with the Viet Cong orchestrated by their neighbor, North Vietnam.
The French Get it Right in Algeria: 1955-1962
In Algeria, the French cut-out the "middleman" and armed their T-6 Texans so they were their own fighter-bombers!
They had fought and lost the first IndoChina war with unwanted, freebee surplus American naval prop planes in the ground attack role; Helldivers, Corsairs, Hellcats and even given the Bearcat its only combat use. These aircraft were lost and now worn-out. They had a supply of P-47s unwanted by the USAF to use in Algeria and bought SkyRaiders. ACIG writes:
The Armée de l'Air was meanwhile facing increasing problem with serviceability of EC.20's fighters. Both types utilised by this unit, F-47D Thunderbolt and Mistral, eventually proved unsuitable for the task at hand: the Thunderbolts were ageing fast while Mistrals lacked armament and endurance. The situation was clear already from earlier times, but it took some times until replacements were available.France turned to the USA, who happened to have a large stock of surplus U.S. Navy Douglas AD-4 Skyraiders, left behind after the end of the Korean War. A contract was placed for 113 Skyraiders of three different versions: 20 x AD-4s, 88 x AD-4Ns and 5 x AD-4NAs. All were shipped from the USA to SFERMA workshops in Bordeaux, some arriving directly while others via Saint-Nazaire. The French removed the radar and ECM-equipment from the rear cabin of AD-4Ns, as well as the arrestor hook for carrier operations. Also, the large fuselage brakes on AD-4s were welded in locked position and all the aircraft received an overall aluminum protective paint and a new "serial" number, applied by SFERMA.
These "new" Skyraiders entered service with EC.20 in December 1959, even if the first AD-4 was not handed over to the unit until February 1960, and their transfer began only in April of the same year. The unit moved from Oran to Boufarik, in central Algeria, where conversion to the new type was completed, and the EC.2/20's Skyraiders began flying combat operations in July 1960, followed by EC.1/20's aircraft, in October. When additional aircraft became available from SFERMA a third escadro0n was added to EC.20: in September 1960 the former EC.1/6 Oranie, flying Mistrals, was disbanded and reformed as Escadron 3/20 Oranie, on AD-4s. From that time onwards the Skyraiders saw action on daily basis, providing close air support to ambushed troops and to heliborne operations.
French Skyraiders were usually armed with four 20mm cannons, and could carry 500kg and 125kg bombs, napalm tanks, HVAR or T-10 rockets. Large drop tanks were procured as well, in order to provide long loiter time over target area. Despite heavy loads carried, the type remained very manoeuvrable at low altitude and low speed, even if the Wright engine disliked the "hot and high" Algerian climates, sand and dust. Over the time the type proved very effective: by 1960 the cooperation between the French air force and ground troops was better than ever, resulting in clear and well-trained procedures for fire direction by ground troops and excellently trained pilots.
Here is the excellent ACIG account of the French success in COIN operations:
French COIN operations in Algeria, 1954-1962
The French then replaced their dwindling supply of Texans with faster T-28 Nomad trainers that the USAF/Navy had replaced their T-6s with.
They improved their Nomads for the ground attack role as "Fennecs".
Americans get it wrong: hypocritical marines say they want to do CAS the ditch SkyRaiders that can do CAS for A-4 SkyHawks that cannot (they do sexy interdiction well); wiser heads in the Navy keep their SkyRaiders for a "rainy day"; Army and Air Force look for other aircraft: T-28s, OV-1s, borrowed SkyRaiders!
USMC CAS Hypocrisy 101
When it suited USMC public image, they praised the Corsair to high heaven. After everyone was fooled, they then retired them after the Korean War while beating their chests how great they WERE. They will brag about smokescreens to help ground maneuver units below from SkyRaiders then retire them a year later.
The following series of publicity photos reveals the lying hypocrisy of the USMC which claims it "invented CAS" and shows how right after the Korean War, they went crazy for sexy jets starting with navalized swept-wing F-86s used by the USAF since they failed to kill many MIGs over Korea in their slower straight-wing jets followed by the A-4 SkyHawk...
1946: Corsair better than nothing for CAS
1949: SkyRaider better choice than Corsair
1954: we ain't gonna be outdone by no USAF!
1958: we are all jets now, baby!
JET EGOTISM POST-KOREA: TAKE A PEEK INTO THE EGOMANIA
USN: Some Common Sense Fights to Remain
The article above shows that at least in the Navy there were those with some common sense intact who had not fallen to the jets-for-everything mentality and selfishness. They still knew that interdicting point targets with jets hadn't stopped the North Koreans nor would it any other foe who employed camouflage, deception and deceit.
The failure or the deliberate sabotage of prop plane development by the jet jocks of contraprops to make them fly safer and faster to be near transonic when required to penetrate enemy air defenses damned SkyRaider models to minor variations. Without new prop planes in production it was only a matter of time before they all would be lost in combat, crashes and simply wear out. We do not believe this was an accident on the part of the ruling jet jocks in the marines, USN, and Air Force.
CARGO
MEDEVAC
C.O.D. SAILOR TRANSPORT
V.I.P. SNOB TRANSPORT 
SKYRAIDER 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8edv3I3T0s
SKYRAIDER 2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2BeD8zDpgM
SKYRAIDER 3
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fD4SJZ4wqU
SKYRAIDER 4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nUmTlsccbo8
SKYRAIDER 5
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-3V4nPMC-rw
So even though the SkyRaiders were far from optimized to their full potential, they soldiered on and got amazing results which surely reminded the jet jock egotists that they must be gotten rid of ASAP. Any limelight taken from them in their zero sum minds is intolerable.
SkyRaiders excelled over the Lebanon countryside during the 1958 crisis able to stay overhead far longer than their jet jock rivals who had to get gas from them.
USMC retires the SkyRaider in 1959 in favor of absurd too-fast jets
In typical manifest hypocrisy, the marines praised the SkyRaider with gushing words as they showed it the door....just like had done earlier with the Corsair...how many ground troops would die shortly in Vietnam from a lack of CAS because of this blunder is worth looking into.
1962
The fact is the USMC today still can't do effective CAS because it replaced the simple, durable and dependable SkyHawk which could operate from short runways with catapults/JATO with the overly complex, unsurvivable-against-enemy-fire (fuel tank co-located with engine exhausts) and still too fast to do CAS
Some minor helps like drag chutes were available but rejected by the USN brass lest the SkyRaider become in vogue again.
As the same pilots flew SkyRaiders over and over again, their inherent ability to fly in more harsh weather conditions than jets became apparent and was used by the USN brass to foist the "all weather" lie to justify their huge supercarriers which can't go through the Panama Canal but have to go around the stormy Cape Horn at the end of South America to go from one ocean to the other.
And even the high torque problem could be flown around if highly skilled pilots operate the SkyRaiders.
Combat T-28s: Army looks, Air Force employs, Navy uses covertly
The T-28 was originally considered as a tail-dragger observation/attack plane for STOL rough field operations. However, as a trainer for jets on paved runways it became widely available with less than optimal tricycle landing gear.
The Army thought about using them as attack planes but decided to go with armed OV-1 Mohawks while the Navy and the Air Force under the latter's secret "FARM GATE" program sent them into combat in southeast asia.
Work was done to turboprop the T-28 to improve it and make it more viable for future operations but the amazing A-37 twinjet was selected by the USAF for COIN work.
Then in a weird case of deja-vu-all-over-again, the un-optimized SkyRaiders in South Vietnamese and American Air Force services were replaced yet again by a new simple attack jet, in this case an A-37 Dragonfly instead of the 650 mph top speed A-4 SkyHawk. Jets can burn lower volatility kerosene fuel that piston gasoline-engined planes can't. Diesel piston engines would be even safer and are available for less than 1, 000 horsepower o/a plane applications today but not back then in the 1960s. Yet these attack jets did not satisfy the egos of the jet fighter jocks, even though the 507 mph top speed A-37 could slow down and fly low enough to render effective CAS. So jet jock prejudice is not just against prop planes, its against ANY PLANE THAT IS NOT THEIRS THAT FLIES FAST AND HIGH, and this explains the current prejudice against the jet A-10 Warthog which still flies too slow and low for them. Attempts to place an observer in the back seat via a two-seat Warthog to enable Airborne Forward Air Control (AFAC) capabilities without pilots crashing into the ground via target fixation have been rejected even though a 2-seat A-10 has already flown.
In a pyramid of ego, there can only be one platform at the top garnering adoration.
During the debacle in Vietnam, it became apparent that the USMC's bloated helicopters couldn't provided their men air mobility and their too fast SkyHawks couldn't render CAS if the latter can't even find the well camouflaged enemy. The desperation Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LARA) was begun since the corps had stupidly dropped out of the OV-1 program and now did not have an observation/attack plane. We describe in detail the LARA program that begat the flawed OV-10 in our previous Killer Bees 2 web page since it represented a chance to create from a clean sheet of paper a MAS plane. The fighter jet egotists killed the OV-10 around 1994.
While we in the U.S. used to have a long-loiter time, ready-to-attack capability with the magnificent A-1 SkyRaider during Korean and Vietnam but even at its peak need, the fast mover egotists in the USAF and USN were out to get rid of these slower attack/observation aircraft using the excuse that in some idealized ultimate combat type between nation-states, they would not fly fast enough to survive; while at the same time when their fast-movers get shot out of the sky, they expected an even slower moving helicopter to come rescue them. Even jet planes were not exempt from censure from the jet jocks. A-6 Intruders would fly attack bombing missions until, they were shot down in the Gulf War, so they were considered "too slow" and retired. Get shot down a few times and you've given the jet jocks all the bureaucratic ammunition needed to retire you. This means you better have adequate countermeasures on board, and since these things are costly and the jet jocks control the budget purse strings, is it any wonder the attack planes were set up for convenient "failures" to further the agenda of fighter pilot egos?
The Navy's A-4 SkyHawk was effective as carrier and land-based interdiction bombers from forward strips for the marines until they were gotten rid of in favor of vulnerable and failed V/TOL AV-8B Harrier jump jets. The AF thanks to some behind the scenes heroics was forced into replacing the A-1 with the fabulous armored A-10 CAS, but though 700 were built only a few are flying today (and maybe soon none) thanks to the fighter jock mafia with agendas other than joint service combat effectiveness.
Other countries and individuals when faced with the need for CAS have improvised with even lesser fixed-wing means. The Saab Supporter with an extra fuel tank in the back can fly for 800 kilometers (600 miles)! This is 4 times the range and endurance of current helicopters! The prop driving engine of an U/MCAV could be easily silenced so it wouldn't announce its presence to the enemy to react and fire at as current as-is helicopters do. An U/MCAV could loiter overhead and nearby Army Ground M113A3 Gavin ACAV troops providing the Maneuver Air Support (MAS) concept that Charles "Chuck" Myers has documented is needed to insure air recon and immediate strikes are available for ground troops even beneath overcast cloud conditions.
Therefore, we propose that we create a test Air/Ground Cavalry Squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division or the 2nd ACR using upgraded M113A3 Gavin ACAVs and a troop of armed micro-helicopters and U/MCAV micro-fixed wing attack aircraft "ASPs" and see what works best; the optimal solution will probably be a combination of both aircraft types; a force of "Killer Bees".
While the ideal U/MCAV ASP would be the Burt Rutan's ARES "Mudfighter" turbofan or ducted-fan jet with 25mm Gatling cannon shooting the same shells as the M113A3 ACAVs and BFVs shoot, we might get faster progress by using in-production and available in wide numbers, combat-proven SAAB Supporter CAS aircraft with auto engines that can burn common JP-8 fuel. Another aspect of the film, "Iron Eagle III" viewers may not realize is that the so-called enemy "German jet" that flies in the final scenes is actually the ARES "mudfighter" experimental attack jet---exactly the kind of fast when it needs to be, yet-agile-enough-to-fly-slow jet that we should have in the U.S. Army firing the laser-guided 2.75 inch rockets shot by the good guys in the film! The downside of the ARES is we would have to build them from scratch, taking money, time and political clout. However, another U/MCAV ASP possibility is the Argentine Pucara turboprop COIN/CAS aircraft which was greatly feared by the British in the 1982 Falklands War who went to great lengths to destroy them on the ground with raids like the Pebble island attack, though all the pesky aircraft were never fully found and neutralized. Pucaras are now fighting Tamil Tiger terrorists in Sri Lanka and available for purchase by the U.S. Army to form a more effective Air Cavalry for MAS. The smaller, less expensive Saab Supporter CAS aircraft also has a good combat history and OV-1 Mohawks are still flying and available. And as you'll see so are A-37s, A-7s, F-5s, and A-4s!
OPTIONS FOR A CAS/MAS O/A PLANE OFF-THE-SHELF
Rebuild The Ultimate Army STOL "Grasshopper": the OV-1 Mohawk: well-designed COIN and FAC aircraft needed today!
OV-1 Mohawks & scout-helicopters
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSW7Dqu4e_8
The Army grasshopper concept reached its zenith with the OV-1 Mohawk which could be BOTH an observation and its own attack aircraft; eliminating for small targets the USAF "middleman". As you will see the weak-egoed USAF brass had a fit over the job they don't want to do and do not want anyone else doing it, either!
Detailed Mohawk photos: AMS Strike Photos!
VIDEOS:
Pre-Vietnam
The Airmobile Division
Vietnam
airmobileOV1MOHAWKSnscouthelicopters.wmv
Desert Shield/Storm
In History: Naval Aircraft--F-7U Cutlass through CH-53E, legendary Naval aircraft developer, George Spanenberg writes:
http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:Sm5mQ84_5-YJ:www.georgespangenberg.com/history2.htm+convair+p6y&hl=en&ie=UTF-8
SPANGENBERG: Then we did the Mohawk, the OF. This was a joint program with the Army. In those days the Department of the Defense would not let the Army do any development so when the Army wanted to start a new program they had to shop either the Air Force or the Navy. Most of the time they seemed to end up with us, with the Navy that is, because we didn't charge them anything for getting involved. It had to become a joint airplane for budget justification reasons so the marines and the Army got together on a joint requirement. The main thing that it provided was side-by-side cockpit with enough power. It was a pretty good flying airplane. It had enough capability to do the bird dog job a lot better than other things were capable of doing. We were still flying the Cubs, the OEs and so was the Army. The Air Force really wasn't flying anything in those days for that mission.
I still remember the marine guys arguing with the Army guys on whether it should be side-by-side or tandem cockpits and some of the same argument had gone on at the early days of the A-2F [Guardian].
RAUSA: Which do you prefer? Depends on the aircraft?
SPANGENBERG: It depends on what you're trying to do. The fighters I thought had to be tandem just for aerodynamic reasons. The subsonic stuff, the advantages of hand motions and communication without having to depend upon the ICS I thought were generally overpowering and during one conference one of the marines, obviously one of the sharp marines -- we were working in a working environment where we had partial bulkheads and the guy went over into the next room and then tried to be a part of the conference. He could hear but he couldn't see. It was a very dramatic way to prove that you're better off sitting at a conference table than have guys on opposite sides of a bulkhead without any visual stuff going on.
The airplane was a great success. The marines dropped out of the thing in order to buy C-130s for tanking.
RAUSA: Are we talking about the Mohawk now?
SPANGENBERG: Yeah. We the Navy had done an excellent job of providing a useful airplane to the Army for close support. The Army could not put bomb racks on an airplane because of the Air Force/Army fight about who does what. The Air Force had not done adequate close support for the Army at any time, according to the Army. They did their version of close support which was anything but what the marines call close support. In developing the airplane we had some 600 pound resupply containers which we put on wing stations.
We got as far as testing the airplane with firing the guns and dropping bombs from those resupply container stations. Patuxent cleared the airplane and at the last minute the Air Force found out about it and prohibited the Army from ever using that capability. We thought we had foxed the Air Force and given the Army a close support capability not as good as they could have had if they had bought some Navy airplanes or had been allowed to by the Air Force but the Air Force seemed very jealous of that. And then we got out of the program and eventually the Army took over. The Army normally took over management after the development because they were allowed to buy "off-the-shelf" airplanes.
From Greg Goebel's Excellent Air Surveillance Web Site
www.vectorsite.net/avbtsv1.html
[1.0] The Grumman OV-1 Mohawk
* The pioneer in the field of battlefield surveillance aircraft was
the Grumman "OV-1 Mohawk", a twin-turboprop machine that served with distinction with the U.S. Army for several decades. This chapter
provides a short history of the OV-1.
[1.1] MOHAWK ORIGINS: G-134 / OV-1A
[1.1] MOHAWK ORIGINS: G-134 / OV-1A
* In late 1954, the U.S. Army issued a requirement for a battlefield
surveillance and utility aircraft, and in early 1956, the Army met
with representatives of six aircraft manufacturers to consider
proposals. The proposals were used to generate a final specification,
which was kicked upstairs to the Pentagon for approval in the spring
of 1956.
At this point, the political wrangling began. The Department of
Defense wanted the Army to talk to the U.S. Air Force (USAF) to ensure
there was no duplication of missions between the two services. The U.S.
Navy, working on behalf of the marine corps, also became involved.
While Army officials haggled with their opposite numbers in the other
armed services, in June 1956 the Army came up with a final
specification for the new aircraft, indicating that it should have
twin turboprop engines for combat survivability; carry a crew of a
pilot and observer; be capable of short takeoffs and landings on
rough airstrips; and be able to fly in bad weather conditions.
The Navy also wanted the aircraft to operate from small escort carriers. Although one of the consequences of interservice politics of the time was that the Army was restricted to operating fixed-wing aircraft with an empty weight of less than 2,270 kilograms (5,000 pounds), the limit was waivered in this case.
In March 1957, Grumman Aircraft Corporation was awarded the contract
to develop the aircraft, which was given the company designation
of "G-134". The contract specified development of nine prototype and
evaluation aircraft, to be designated "YAO-1AF".
The relationship between the services over the G-134 was quarrelsome.
Combat Experience Showed Observation Aircraft Must Be Armed
The marines wanted a simple spotter aircraft to replace their old
Cessna "OE-1 Bird Dogs", and were not interested in the sophisticated sensor payloads that the Army was considering for the G-134. The marines also wanted the G-134 to have stores pylons to carry weapons, which annoyed the Air Force, which wanted to retain control of the battlefield close-support mission.
However, the Navy decided to build a fleet tanker vessel and didn't have the money to buy the marines a new observation aircraft. The Navy and marines pulled out of the program in September 1957, much to the relief of the Army. The Army reserved an "OF-1" designation for a marine version in case the issue raised its ugly head again, and got
on with development.
* The first Grumman YAO-1AF flew on 14 April 1959, with Grumman chief
test pilot Ralph Donnell at the controls. The flight test program
went very smoothly, with few major changes required to the basic
design. The aircraft proved to be extremely agile, and had a low
stalling speed and very good short-field performance.
It was also powerful and fast, compared to the piston-engined
aircraft previously flown by many Army aviators, and in fact set a
number of performance records for its class. The type's high
performance would eventually lead to a number of deadly accidents,
caused by pilots who became over-enthusiastic at the controls. This
was not really a fault of the aircraft, which flew well and was
extremely strong. Although the YAO-1F was designed for a ten-year
service life, fatigue tests demonstrated that it would probably be
good for twice that, a tribute to Grumman's custom of building very
rugged aircraft.
The YAO-1F was originally to be named "Montauk", following the Army's tradition of naming aircraft after American native tribes, but the Montauk tribe was judged too obscure and the name "Mohawk" was used instead. The Mohawk tribe was better known, and also had a reputation as a tribe of fearsome warriors.
The YAO-1F was ordered into production as the "AO-1F", going into US
Army service in Germany in 1961 and in Vietnam in September 1962. In
that month, the U.S. military services consolidated their aircraft
designation schemes, and the Mohawk designations became "YOV-1A"
and "OV-1A" respectively. The most distinctive difference between the
evaluation and production aircraft was that the production aircraft
were fitted with black rubber pneumatic de-icing boots on the leading
edges of the flight surfaces.
[1.2] OV-1A DESCRIBED / JOV-1A
* The OV-1A carried a KA-30 or later a KS-61 camera in a bay in the
rear fuselage. The camera could pivot from horizon to horizon. Boxy
photoflash flare pods could be fitted above the wing roots to provide
a total capacity of 52 flares, which were ejected upward to ensure
that the flash was above the camera and so did not blind them.
One unusual feature was an AN/ADR-6 radiation detector ("radiac"),
fitted in the rear fuselage to allow the aircraft to map radiation on
a nuclear battlefield. The detector activated a cockpit alarm if
radiation levels were high enough to put the crew at risk. The Mohawk
was also fitted with a comprehensive suite of radio and navigation
gear, as well as an IFF transponder.
The Mohawk had a bulged cockpit with a snub nose to provide a
superlative view for its pilot and observer. Canopy side panels
hinged upward to allow entrance and exit from the cockpit, with a
boarding step sliding down from each side of the nose below the
panels.
The two flight crew sat in armored Martin-Baker Mark 5 ejection seats, which fired through frangible canopy top panels. Ejection seats were adopted because the Mohawk had big props on either side of the cockpit that blocked a conventional bailout, and the Mohawk was intended to fly operationally at low altitudes, making a "manual" bailout impossible in any case. The Mark 5 seats could be fired from zero altitude, but required a minimum flight speed of 185 KPH (100 knots) to be used safely. Improved seats were later fitted that reduced the minimum safe flight speed to 110 KPH (60 knots).
The cockpit floor was 6.4 millimeter (1/4 inch) thick aluminum alloy
plate for protection against small-arms fire; the windshield glass
was bullet-resistant and 2.5 centimeters (an inch) thick; and the
cockpit could be fitted with flak curtains on the forward and rear
walls. Heavy-duty windshield wipers were provided to deal with wet
weather.
The Mohawk had tricycle landing gear, with the nosewheel retracting backward and the main gear retracting outward into the wings. All the gear had single wheels. Low-pressure tires were fitted to heavy-duty struts for rough-field operation, and a small tailskid was fitted to protect the rear fuselage during steep short-field takeoffs.
The evaluation aircraft had been fitted with Lycoming T53-L-3
turboprops with 960 horsepower each, but in production the engines
were updated to T53-L-7s with 1,005 horsepower each. The Mohawk is said to have been the first fixed-wing aircraft to be fitted with the T53, the engine already having been selected for the Bell "Huey" helicopter.
The engines were mounted on top of the wings, giving them some
protection against ground fire, and "toed out" slightly to improve
engine-out handling. The exhausts were on top of the nacelles, which
would later give the aircraft a degree of protection against man-
portable heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The engines
drove three-bladed Hamilton Standard propellers with a diameter of
3.05 meters (10 feet). The propellers were fully reversible to reduce
landing roll.
The wings had a 6.5 degree dihedral, and were fitted with large-area
flaps and full-span leading-edge slats to reduce takeoff roll.
Interestingly, the leading-edge slats would prove ineffective in
Vietnam and would be generally bolted down in that theater.
Take-off run was 358 meters (1,175 feet), in contrast to 1,160 meters
(3,800 feet) for a Lockheed C-130 Hercules. Although an early G-134 mockup featured a high tee tail, this proved inconvenient for engine-out flight, and a distinctive triple-fin tail scheme was adopted
instead.
A hydraulically-operated dive brake was fitted to either side of the
rear fuselage behind the wing. Internal fuel capacity was 1,125
liters (297 U.S. gallons) in a single self-sealing fuel tank in the
fuselage above the wings, giving the Mohawk an endurance of 2 hours
20 minutes. The tank was part of the aircraft's frame, and it was
built very strong, with panels from it subjected to machine-gun fire
in tests to ensure survivability.
In operation the Mohawk generally carried a 567 liter (150 US gallon) fuel tank under each wing, giving the aircraft an endurance of 4 hours 30 minutes. Double-size external tanks could be used for ferry
flights, but these were rarely used. The aircraft was designed for
easy maintenance, with direct access to the majority of systems
through panels that could be reached without ladders or work stands.
* The OV-1A was designed to be fitted with up to six underwing
pylons, but only two were fitted in production, to allow it to carry
the two external tanks. The Army, claiming that they wanted the OV-1A
to be able to fire rockets to mark targets and protect itself, had
Grumman refit 54 Mohawks with all six pylons and install a Mark 20 fixed reticle gunsight in the cockpit for the pilot.
These modified aircraft were redesignated "JOV-1A", and evaluated
with 7 round or 19 round 70 millimeter (2.75 inch) rocket pods; SUU-
12 12.7 millimeter (0.50 caliber) machine gun pods; 225 kilogram (500
pound) bombs; 140 millimeter (5 inch) Zuni rockets; and flares.
The Air Force saw the JOV-1A as an Army attempt to perform the close
support mission, which they believed was "their job". They objected
loudly, and the Army formally changed the name back to OV-1A, though
they did not remove the pylons or the gunsight. Many of these
aircraft would serve in Vietnam, often carrying smoke rockets, and
sometimes more lethal stores for "self-defense".
The Air Force remained very touchy about the issue, even demanding
that Grumman drop company brochures that highlighted the Mohawk's
attack capability. In 1965, the Pentagon handed down a directive
dictating that the Army would not operate armed fixed-wing aircraft.
[1.3] OV-1B / OV-1C
* Even before the first flight of the OV-1A, plans were in place to
develop two follow-on variants, the "OV-1B" and the "OV-1C", to
exploit new sensor technologies as they became available. Despite
their consecutive designations, the OV-1B and OV-1C were produced in
parallel.
The prototype OV-1B was modified from one of the nine evaluation YOV-
1As. The primary enhancement was the addition of of the big
Motorola "AN/APS-94 Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR)", with the
radar antenna in a 5.5 meter (18 foot) long, boxy, yaw-stabilized
fiberglass pod slung under the right fuselage. The OV-1B retained the
optical cameras.
The APS-94 SLAR provided an imaging reconnaissance capability in day
or night, in any weather. It shot radar signals to either or both
sides of the aircraft and recorded the echoes onto photographic film
strips, which were automatically developed in flight. The right-side
flight controls were deleted and a sensor station was installed to
allow an operator to monitor and control the SLAR. The SLAR also had
a "moving target indicator (MTI)" capability to highlight vehicles in
motion on the imagery.
The OV-1B featured an increased wingspan of 1.79 meters (5 feet 10
inches) to help lift the SLAR. Airbrakes were deleted to save weight,
and only two stores pylons were fitted. An autopilot and Doppler
navigation radar were added to help the aircraft fly nice neat radar
mapping patterns, and a new VHF data link was installed to allow real-
time relay of SLAR data to a ground station.
Late OV-1B production featured up-rated Lycoming T53-L-15 turboprops
with 1,150 horsepower each. Oddly, this was not done to improve
flight performance. While the bug-eyed canopy provided excellent
visibility, it also turned the cockpit into a greenhouse in sunny
weather, and flight crews could return to base sopping with sweat.
Operations in the hot Vietnamese climate demanded a hefty air
conditioning system, and the additional horsepower was to drive the
air conditioning! Older aircraft were retrofitted with the T53-L-15
as well. 90 OV-1Bs were built.
* Initial OV-1C production examples simply amounted to an OV-1A with
a "UAS-4 Red Haze" infrared (IR) sensor system in addition to its
optical cameras. The UAS-4 could spot fires, hot truck engines, and
other evidence of enemy activities at night, in poor weather, or
under jungle canopy. The UAS-4 was originally mounted in the rear
fuselage, but was later put in a blister on the belly just behind the
wing, along with a panoramic camera and an anti-collision light.
As with the OV-1B, the right-side flight controls were deleted and
replaced with a sensor control station, and the IR data was recorded
on film strips. The UAS-4 was later replaced with the more
sensitive "UAS-14", which included a data link to allow
reconnaissance data to be transferred to battlefield commanders in
real time. The OV-1C was also said to have featured a chute to allow
the flightcrew to drop messages to field units. It is unclear if
other Mohawk variants had this little feature.
After the delivery of a few initial OV-1Cs, production was changed to
feature the wider span of the OV-1B, and the airbrakes were deleted
as well. Late production OV-1Cs had a nose panel for a KA-60
panoramic camera that could take 180 degree pictures in front of the
aircraft, and this feature was also retrofitted to older aircraft.
Late production OV-1Cs were also fitted with the up-rated T53-L-15
engines, and these aircraft were sometimes called "Super Cs". As with
the OV-1B, many older OV-1Cs were retrofitted with the uprated
engines. 133 OV-1Cs were built, with final delivery in 1969.
[1.4] OV-1D / MOHAWK IN VIETNAM
* The SLAR and IR sensor systems greatly enhanced the Mohawk's
capabilities, and it was logical to develop a Mohawk variant that could carry either, though not both, of them. The result was the
definitive "OV-1D".
The OV-1D featured three fast-access compartments that allowed the IR
sensor and the APS-94 SLAR electronics systems to be easily swapped
out. The canoe pod for the SLAR could be bolted on or removed
quickly. A full configuration change took no more than an hour. Both
sensor systems used the same cockpit display and control panel.
The OV-1D had the wider wingspan of the OV-1B, but also was fitted
with airbrakes. It featured an updated camera suite, including the
panoramic camera in the nose, a panoramic camera in the fuselage, and
a "serial frame" camera under the fuselage to provide along-track
imagery.
Night imagery could be obtained using an electronic photoflash unit
carried in a wing pod. Flares had proven troublesome to handle in the
field, with improperly loaded flares said to have caused accidents in
which the entire flare load lit off in the launcher pack. The
photoflash pod was also used by older Mohawk variants.
Avionics improvements were added as well, particularly in the form of
the "ASN-86 inertial navigation system", which provided accurate all-
weather flight guidance. In addition, updated defensive countermeasures systems were added, and the aircraft could carry an "ALQ-147 Hot Brick" heat-seeking missile jammer on an underwing
pylon.
A total of 37 x OV-1Ds were built, and 108 older Mohawk variants were upgraded to the OV-1D standard, including four OV-1Cs rebuilt as
the "YOV-1D" pre-production prototypes. Two OV-1Ds of this total were
provided to Israel in 1974, though they were returned to U.S. service
in 1976.
GRUMMAN OV-1D MOHAWK:
spec metric english
wingspan 14.63 meters 48 feet
empty weight 5,330 kilograms 11,760 pounds
maximum speed 490 KPH 305 MPH / 265 KT
* Apparently the Army had some misgivings about the Mohawk at first, as the fussing over the type with the marines and the Navy had led to an aircraft that was more complicated and expensive than the Army had originally wanted. However, once the machine went into combat the Army decided they'd made the right choice after all. The Mohawk performed outstanding service in the Vietnam war,
providing excellent intelligence on enemy positions and activities.
It operated over South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and occasionally even
North Vietnam. The Mohawk often flew in cooperative missions with U.S.
Air Force, Navy, or marine forces.
The Mohawk's ability to operate from forward airstrips and provide real-time intelligence was a great benefit to Army field commanders, permitting immediate artillery or air strikes to be called in on enemy troop movements. It was also occasionally used to parachute supply canisters carried on under-wing pylons to combat units in
isolated locations.
Its agility, ability to fly low, and its relatively quiet turboprop
engines allowed it to sneak up on the enemy unannounced, and the
enemy is said to have referred to it as the "Whispering Death". Its
combat survivability was very good, and its reliability and
maintainability were outstanding, with the highest availability rate
of any Army aircraft.
The lack of serious offensive armament was troublesome to field
commanders, however, because in many cases the Mohawks found
concentrations of enemy troops who would be gone by the time strikes
could be called in. The field commanders argued at length but in vain
against the Air Force restriction on armed Army fixed-wing aircraft.
In many cases, the Mohawks were armed anyway.
In 1966, one Mohawk reputedly shot down a North Vietnamese MiG-17 fighter with 70 millimeter unguided rockets. The North Vietnamese
pilot made a pass at one of a pair of Mohawks, the other loosed a salvo of rockets at the fighter, and to the surprise of all, managed
to hit the MiG. However, one Mohawk was shot down by a North
Vietnamese MiG in 1969, evening the score. This was the only Army
fixed-wing aircraft loss in air-to-air combat during the war.
A total of 27 Mohawks were lost in combat action in Vietnam,
including one destroyed on the ground, and a further 36 were lost in
accidents. There is a story that the crew of one shot-up Mohawk
ejected, and the aircraft then obligingly crashed into a scrapyard.
In 1972, Mohawks began to be transferred to the Army National Guard, but the type still remained in first-line regular Army service for two decades longer.
[1.5] MODIFICATIONS & PROPOSALS
* Several Mohawk modifications also saw service. Since it was
designed for the reconnaissance role and could carry sophisticated
sensors, it was well suited for modification to the "electronic
intelligence (ELINT)" role.
The exact history of the use of the Mohawk as an ELINT platform is a little confusing, particularly because in some cases the
modifications were secret. Apparently, in the early 1960s, one OV-1B
had its SLAR removed and replaced by an "AN/ALQ-133 emitter location
system", with antennas in boxy underwing pods and an antenna in place
of the SLAR boom, to locate and target adversary radar and
communications centers. Targeting data was relayed in real time back
to ground commanders over a data link.
This aircraft was originally given the designation "EV-1D", though
the designation was later changed to "RV-1B". This led to a formal
program named "QUICK LOOK I" to update a number of OV-1Cs to a
similar ELINT configuration based on the ALQ-133. Several dozen OV-
1Bs were later updated to the OV-1B airframe configuration, given an
upgraded ELINT suite under the "QUICK LOOK II" program, and
redesignated "RV-1D". There were also some classified ELINT
modifications of the Mohawk whose details remain unclear.
In the late 1980s, a few OV-1Ds were modified as prototypes for an
advanced "OV-1E" variant with a "glass cockpit", "Global Positioning
System (GPS)" satellite receiver, and other modernized kit, but the
military didn't buy off on the idea and it went no farther.
* There were a number of proposals for Mohawk variants that never
happened. In 1960, Grumman proposed an "AO-1EF (OV-1E)", with the
forward fuselage stretched 71 centimeters (28 inches) to accommodate
a third seat for a sensor systems operator. The additional space
could also be used for cargo. The OV-1E never went beyond the mockup
stage.
One particularly adventurous proposal was the "Model 134E" Mohawk, which was to be a "tilt-wing" vertical takeoff aircraft with four turboprops, a horizontal tail rotor, and a stretched fuselage to allow it to carry cargo or 11 troops. The Army wasn't interested, and the project never got beyond the paper stage.
Both Germany and France were interested in the Mohawk and performed flight evaluations with it in 1962 and 1963. The French Breguet company actually obtained a license from Grumman to build it, fitted with more powerful de Havilland Gnome turboprops, but the deal fell through.
Grumman also came up with a design for an extensively modified
Mohawk "Model 134R" with an armored tandem cockpit and built-in gun
armament as a "COunter INsurgency (COIN)" aircraft for the
Army's "Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LARA)" competition, but
lost to Rockwell International's OV-10A Bronco.
The Philippines later came up with a request for a COIN aircraft, and
Grumman responded with a more conservative proposal to update 20 OV-
1Bs to a fully armed standard, while Rockwell proposed the OV-10A.
However, the Philippine government came up short on money and the
sale never happened.
One OV-1B was experimentally fitted with a midair refueling probe for
ferry flights, but this scheme was not adopted. Snow ski landing gear
was successfully evaluated for the Mohawk, but it was never used
operationally.
There was even an early scheme to fit the Mohawk with water ski landing gear, in response to a marine request, to allow it to land on calm waters and taxi up to a beach. The concept was successfully tested, but it wasn't used operationally. Apparently pilots were not comfortable with the idea of setting an aircraft down on water with the prospect of sinking if taxi speed fell too low.
[1.6] CIVILIAN MOHAWKS
* In the post-Vietnam era, the Mohawk generally operated with the U.S. Army in Germany and South Korea, though it did see limited service in Central America as well.
It was also employed by civilian organizations. Army Mohawks were flown in missions to support the U.S. Forest Service to spot forest fires and obtain survey data on the spread of tree diseases. In 1980, Oregon Army National Guard Mohawks flew surveillance missions to monitor the eruption of Mount Saint Helens in southwestern Washington state. Army Mohawks also assisted the U.S. Coast Guard, the Civil Air Patrol, and state and local public-safety organizations in search and rescue operations, with the SLAR and IR sensors proving particularly useful in hunting for crashed aircraft in mountainous terrain.
In the early 1970s, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) performed large-
area mapping missions with an OV-1B fitted with a modified SLAR. The
flights were part of a study to determine state water resources, and
the aircraft was later used to perform survey missions in Alaska.
During the Alaska missions, the aircraft carried emergency floatation
gear on the underwing pylons to allow the flightcrew to ditch at sea
in an emergency, since ejecting into the frigid Arctic environment
would have given little chance of survival. The primary pilots for
the USGS OV-1B were a pair of grandmothers who had tired of being
secretaries, taken flight lessons, and became topnotch pilots.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used a specially
modified OV-1C on loan from the Army to perform environmental surveys
of the areas around nuclear power plants in the early 1970s, and a
civilian engineering firm working for the Atomic Energy Commission
also obtained an OV-1C to monitor underground atomic tests during
1972. The U.S. National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) used
a few Mohawks for aviation technology experiments, including one that
was fitted with a small turbojet engine for noise tests.
In a particularly interesting application, in 1971 the U.S. Customs
Service received four Army surplus OV-1C Mohawks, along with two ex-
Navy Grumman S-2 Tracker ocean patrol aircraft, to hunt for drug
trafficers. The Mohawks were fitted with a Texas Instruments forward looking infrared (FLIR) camera in a turret under an extended nose.
As the Customs OV-1Cs were sometimes fired on by drug runners, there
was some thought of arming the Mohawks so they could shoot back, but despite the fact that Customs officers often carry some impressive
personal firepower arming a Customs aircraft was judged against the
rules. The Mohawks were phased out in favor of more modern aircraft
in 1986.
At least three Mohawks ended up in private hands, and occasionally starred in TV series such as "AIRWOLF", with their unusual looks making them well suited to playing the "bad guy.
The last Mohawks in U.S. Army service were withdrawn in the mid-1990s. These aircraft were used to observe North Korean military activities along the demilitarized zone, and were replaced by De Havilland Canada DASH-7 / Airborne Reconnaissance Low aircraft, the subject of the next chapter. 34 x U.S. Army surplus Mohawks were provided to Argentina in the early 1990s, and at last report these aircraft were still in service.
DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN: here is yet another irony in the U.S. military's CAS debacle...
In the post-WWII "jet" era, a funny thing has happened...time after time the prop-driven close air support aircraft has been "re-invented" by the necessity of the many small wars taking place. The reason is simple; jets fly too fast to see anything on the ground and burn up too much fuel to remain overhead.
Robert Johnson of Chandelle magazine has brilliantly documented this truth with inspired writing and skilled artwork in the following, must-read web pages!
Here is an excerpt: guess what this sounds like?
Despite considerable interest and some off-shore procurement funding from the United States, the Voltigeur and the Epervier never saw production. The Algerian war was over before the intended turboprop engines became available, and France's greatly reduced postwar COIN needs were more than met by the many remnaining AD4N Skyraiders. A 67%-identical, commercial transport derived from the Voltigeur, the SE.118 Diplomate, also failed to attract orders."
Maybe the U.S. Army when it was drawing up plans for the Mohawk in the late 1950s they were studying from the French combats in Algeria, huh?
In Heart of Darkness: the Tragedy of the Congo, 1960-67 Robert Johnson explains how the CIA in a pinch created instant air forces using prop planes turned into attack aircraft to support Counter Insurgency (COIN) missions like the Belgian Congo crisis where U.S., Belgian and French Paratroopers have had to intervene several times to save hostages and restore order:
Even the Sri Lankan Air Force is better equipped with fixed-wing CAS aircraft than the U.S. military is now (under-utilization of A-10 is implied here)!
In an excellent article in the January 2003 Soldier of Fortune magazine, "Operation Oman" Jim Bartlett describes how Strikemaster jet trainers/attack planes were used fore low and slow surgical strikes against insurgents with less risk of killing the civilians the British SAS wanted to win over to their side in the 1970s. A "lesson" we should take to heart in our current blood-thirsty approach in Afghanistan. The time to be brutal was when Bin Laden and Al Queda terrorists were in Afghanistan to seal off the border areas with thousands of Paratroopers so they couldn't escape. Now is the time to primarily rid the country of the terrorists by aggressive civil affairs actions to show the government should be supported not the islamofascists.
In Combat Crop Dusters: the Turbo-Thrush NEDS and the V-1-A Vigilante, Rob Johnson describes how via necessity U.S. agencies have had to improvise low-flying CAS aircraft to fight drug wars in Latin America....
He describes how the marine-designed OV-10 failed as a combat drug crop duster in Drug wars revisited: State Department OV-10D Broncos in South America. Its ironic since before the "LARA" OV-10 flew the OV-1 Mohawk, a faster and better handling airplane was offered to the dumb marines as an attack/observation aircraft in a joint program with the U.S. Army. The marines quit and years later, stuck in a war in Vietnam, they found themselves in need of an observation/attack airplane so they wasted several million tax dollars on a new OV-10 when OV-1s were already combat-proven and available. Then----years later--------after a couple of Broncos are shot down in Desert Storm, they "give up the ghost" and retire the aircraft. Now, even a few more years later, high over Afghanistan we have no long-loiter manned observation/attack aircraft (UAVs see through a "soda straw") and they have no escort aircraft for their V-22s if they can be made to work! Is it a wonder the enemy escapes our "precision firepower"??? Stupid is what stupid does!:
* Armored
Basically the "Deja CAS" cycle goes as follows:
1. Arming fixed-wing prop-planes (usually trainers) with rockets and guns
2. Adding Armor to the prop planes when they start receiving enemy fire doing CAS
3. Realizing the prop trainers are under-powered designing a specially-made attack airplane
4. OOPS! the war is over before the CAS plane is built
5. The prop planes are retired...
Until of course the next war flares up and they will be hurriedly armed once again...
Why can't we operate attack jets forward with the grunts in the mud? The Deja travesty continues!
Nation-State western militaries see war as an expression of man's ego and think they should be trained and equipped for high-tech battle against another nation-state army and look at things like they are in egotistical competition with each other for budget/glory. The CAS aircraft flying lower and slower gets the "short end of the stick" even though its RELEVANT to the wars that take place while the Mach 2+ Top Gun is mostly not. Jet aircraft are flown by pampered egotists who want to stay out of the mud and fly from safe bases in the rear where there is air conditioning and good chow. Grunts need CAS in a hurry and can't wait for the fly-boys to wake up and fly to drop ordance and fire guns forward where they are at; the prop or jets need to be near the front lines!
U.S. Army two-seat A-4 SkyHawks for CAS?
Legendary designer Ed Heinemann tried to work around this hubris by designing attack aircraft that could be simple, sturdy and fast when they needed to be--like the A-4 SkyHawk.
According to John Pike of Global Security, "765 A-4 aircraft worldwide. Pound for pound, the A-4 aircraft is one of the most effective and versatile light attack aircraft produced. The Skyhawk is 34 years old; yet export models are still highly regarded and undergoing modern avionics, weapons, and engine upgrades to maintain their flying prowess into the next century."
Maximum speed: 586 knots (with a 4,000 pound ordnance load)
Has one fuselage and four wing racks and carries a variety of external stores. May be provisioned for Sidewinder, Shrike, and Walleye missiles and 1,000 pound bombs.
According to the SkyHawk organization web page: www.skyhawk.org/2C/productionhistory.htm, in 1961, two A4D-2 SkyHawks (BuNos 148490 and 148483) were borrowed by the U.S. Army and modified by Douglas for evaluation in competition with the Northrop N-156 (predecessor of the F-5) and an Italian Fiat G-91, for operations from unimproved airfields near front lines. Modificatons of the Army SkyHawk included large dual wheels on beefed-up main landing gear mounts; a heavier wing to house the larger landing gear; and installation of an A-3 Skywarrior drag chute. Flown by Douglas test pilot Dru Wood, the modified "Army" SkyHawk won the competition, but the project was cancelled when Army funds were diverted to helicopter procurement.
If ZERO length take-offs (ZEL) are too "extreme" (war is an extreme act,
remember?), the fact remains that rocket bottles attached to aircraft (mistakenly called "JATO") has been done for decades to get aircraft short take-off capabilities.
JATO was first used with early turbojet fighters which were very
under-powered and needed ridiculously long runways to take-off.
The French located not far from the then Soviet Union could not take even 15
minutes to get its bombers airborne like USAF SAC and used JATO to get their
dispersed and hidden Mirage IV nuclear bombers into the air instantly.
When the U.S. Army considered a CAS fighter since the USAF was typically not providing adequate support, the N-156 was considered using JATO to operate from short runways. The N-156 became the F-5 Freedom Fighter.
Another candidate for an Army CAS attack plane was the A-4 SkyHawk which was adopted by the USMC and used on short 4, 000 foot runway SATS land bases in Vietnam like at Chu Lai. With JATO SkyHawks could take-off in just 2,000 feet.
The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) purchased 47 refurbished SkyHawks (40 A-4B, 7 TA-4) from U.S. in 1972. The aircraft were designated A-4S/TA-4S. The "T" version of the RSAF SkyHawk was unique in that, rather than the single "clam shell" canopy common to other TA-4 models, each TA-4S cockpit had a separate canopy.
From 1984 to 1989, the RSAF conducted a SkyHawk service life extension program. The 8,400-lb-thrust J65 engines were replaced with 11,000 lb. thrust F404-GE-100D turbofans. Other upgrades included modified engine air intakes; new structural mounts to accommodate the F404 engines; installation of new refrigeration, hydraulic pumps, air turbine starters, and oil coolers; new sensors, cockpit instrumentation, and state-of-the-art avionics; engine and environmental control systems; higher output electrical generators; and improved air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance carrying and control capability.
Re-designated as A-4SU "Super SkyHawk," the refurbished SkyHawks became operational in 1988, and SkyHawk pilot training was fully operational in March 989.
With the total RSAF inventory of about 60 aircraft, the three Singapore SkyHawk units (142, 143, and 145 Squadrons), operating from Tengah Air Base, made up a numerical majority of that country's military aircraft.
In late 1997, the RSAF SkyHawk training unit (143 squadron) was disbanded as part of a new advanced jet training effort. The former 143 Squadron A-4SUs were shipped to southwest France in September 1998 where, at Cazaux Air Base, RSAF pilots will participate in advanced training through 2003. The French site was selected because it offers access to needed practice bombing ranges and airspace over the North Atlantic for ACM training, as well as opportunity for electronic warfare technique practice.
John Pike in his excellent A-4 SkyHawk web page states further:
"The Blue Angel Squadron donned a new aircraft in 1974, the McDonnell Douglas A-4F SkyHawk II. The new aircraft transformed the display team. The nimble SkyHawk was the opposite of the powerful Phantom. The SkyHawk was more aerobatic, and allowed tighter display in front of the audience. On 08 November 1986, the Blue Angels completed their 40th anniversary."
"The OA-4M, a two-seat SkyHawk, provided tactical air control services as well
as many other utility missions. "
The A-4 is a VERY tolerant airplane re AAA/small arms, etc. due to designer Ed Heinemmann's design excellence.
Chuck Myers writes:
Harriers had some success against Mirage because of advanced AIM-9L and the fact that they were there because they were STOVL and could fly from UK miniature carriers, not because of any other attribute. Harrier is a poor maneuvering aircraft. Very high wing loading!! Poor cockpit visibility. A-4 and Mirages attacking UK fleet were operating at the end of their tether. If they had prepared base in Falklands, the fleet would never have gotten close enough"
Half the A-4s hit by the SAM-7 in the Arab/Israeli conflicts got home -but that was Also due to the little warhead of Grail but protection is more a function of what type countermeasures you apply, the basic aircraft is very robust. The A-4 is the antithesis of the AV-8. AND, it is VERY agile and small and hard to see (used in the film, "Top Gun"). Illustrates the stupidity of MC giving up the A-4 to go to AV-8 at about triple the life cycle cost."
The Navy still has eight A-4Ms flying in an aggressor squadron in Puerto Rico. They are good "dissimilar" aircraft since they are smaller and can turn tighter. Since smaller aircraft are harder to see and hit.
Even more interesting -some foreign SkyHawks had their 20mm cannon replaced
with 30mm DEFA guns. That is the same ammo as the ASP-30mm, and of the M230s on AH-64 Apache attack helicopters that took out the backs of T-72 tank turrets at 4000m in Desert Storm. A few years ago, GE fitted the GAU-8 30mm gun pod to the A-4 ------the same tank killer the A-10 uses---imagine that! Can also use the podded 25mm which is internal gun for Harrier.
Currently there are 86 x A-4 SkyHawks in storage at the USAF's "boneyard".
Details (to include photos):
MAS-WG OA-4Z SkyHawk Proposal for Maneuver Air Support (MAS)
U.S. Army N-156 (F-5s)?
Part 1
www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFIyzUdVr-Q
Part 2
www.youtube.com/watch?v=CGvEdvPBNX8
Part 3
www.youtube.com/watch?v=cGY2vIlF7TM
Page 4
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVpaGaC-eKI
Part 5
www.youtube.com/watch?v=jfUvhW_WakI
The Northrop N-156F light strike fighter prototype was one of three jet-powered, fixed-wing attack aircraft selected by the Army in 1961 for competitive evaluation in the forward air control (FAC), tactical reconnaissance, and ground attack roles. The N-156F was chosen for testing primarily because of its relatively simple design, impressive load-carrying capacity, and ability to operate from unimproved forward airfields.
Northrop had begun development of the N-156 family of low-cost, lightweight supersonic aircraft in 1956, with the first design being that of the N-156F single-seat fighter version. Much to Northrop's chagrin the Air Force showed no real interest in the N-156F, though in June 1956 the service's Air Training Command did adopt a two-seat trainer variant as the T-38 Talon. In the spring of 1958 the Department of Defense renewed Northrop's hopes for the fighter version by directing the USAF to procure three N-156F prototypes for engineering and operational evaluation. The first of these aircraft (serial 59-4987) made its initial flight in July 1959, less than four months after the maiden flight of the first T-38. The Air Force's attitude towards the N-156F did not change appreciably despite the aircraft's excellent showing in the evaluations, however, and work on the number three prototype was halted prior to completion because the USAF did not feel that the remaining tests required a third aircraft. At the end of the test period the Air Force announced that it would not procure the N-156F, and Northrop was forced to temporarily suspend work on the fighter version. The company thus viewed the Army's 1961 decision to evaluate the N-156F as a possible reprieve and gladly supplied the first prototype machine and a complete ground support staff for the tests.
The N-156F was of fairly conventional layout with thin, slightly-swept, low-set wings, a fuselage characterized by a narrow area-rule section amidships, a one-piece 'all-moving' tail plane, a rather large vertical fin, and tricycle landing gear. The aircraft was built primarily of aluminium, and Northrop made considerable use of adhesive-bonded honeycomb as a stiffener in critical areas. The N-156F was powered by two afterburning General Electric J85 turbojets mounted side-by-side in the aft fuselage, and could be fitted with up to four 1,000 pound JATO (Jet-Assisted Take Off) bottles for operation from extremely short fields. More than a quarter of the aircraft's total fuselage area consisted of easily-removable access panels to simplify field maintenance, and both engines were attached to built-in overhead tracks for easy removal.
The Army's evaluation of the N-156F found it to be a well-built and capable aircraft, easy-to-maintain under field conditions and capable of carrying a significant offensive load while operating from the most rudimentary forward airstrips. These abilities were ultimately rendered meaningless, however, by the Army's decision to accede to Air Force pressure and abandon the quest for fixed-wing jet aircraft. The sole N-156F tested by the Army was susbsequently returned to Northrop, and was eventually converted into the prototype YF-5A Freedom Fighter.
U.S. Army A-7 Corsair II?
USAF boneyard has 227 x A-7 Corsair IIs!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Satellite Pics from Space of the Davis-Monthan AFB
Lots of SkyHawks, too!
v1.1.1 / 1 of 4 / 01 jun 02 / greg goebel / public domain
[1.2] OV-1A DESCRIBED / JOV-1A
[1.3] OV-1B / OV-1C
[1.4] OV-1D / MOHAWK IN VIETNAM
[1.5] MODIFICATIONS & PROPOSALS
[1.6] CIVILIAN MOHAWKS
length (no SLAR) 12.5 meters 41 feet
length (with SLAR) 13.69 meters 44 feet 11 inches
height 3.86 meters 12 feet 8 inches
max loaded weight 8,215 kilograms 18,110 pounds
service ceiling 7,620 meters 25,000 feet
range 1,520 kilometers 945 MI / 822 NMI
"The Sud-Aviation SE.117 Voltigeur ("Skirmisher") was, with the Dassault Spirale, a competitor for the twin-engined requirement. The SE.117 was a 2-to6-seat multirole aircraft armed with two 30-mm DEFA cannon in semi-external, fuselage pods. Underwing loads could include one 1000-lb and two 500-lb bombs, 24 rockets, or four AS.11 missiles. The pilot and co-pilot/observer sat side-by-side in an extensively glazed nose compartment, well ahead of the low-mounted wing. To facilitate air-to-ground operations at low level, large, perforated dive brakes were fitted on the rear fuselage. The first prototype, the SE.116, flew in December 1958 powered by a pair of 800-hp, Wright R-1300 Cyclone piston engines. Production versions would have had Bastan turboprops. The estimated maximum speed for the Voltigeur was 277 mph (236 mph cruising). Initial climb rate was to be 2677 ft/min and ceiling was 30,800 ft. Range topped 1100 miles and endurance was more than 5 hours. The airplane spanned 59 ft, was 40 ft 6 in long, and had a wing area of 443.5 sq ft.
Hmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.........sounds like an OV-1 Mohawk! ...and it looked like one, if you look at Johnson's art work on his
CHANDELLE web page or see the Voltigeur art above!
"The shorter-ranged T-28s could now be farmed out to fields around the country, where they could respond to calls for close air support much more quickly than the B-26s."
Too bad we didn't have some T-6 Texans or T-28 Nomads armed with GAU-19/A .50 caliber gatlings and laser-guided 2.75 inch Hydra-70mm rockets flying over Iraq/Afghanistan now, huh? Texans Nomads
The Bronco did not go unnoticed, however, in the mountain valleys of Bolivia, Columbia, Peru, Thailand, and Burma. The growers quickly recognized the threat and threw their considerable resources against the aircraft. Machine guns, automatic antiaircraft cannon, and shoulder-launched missiles were soon being fired against the Broncos, and it quickly became clear that they were not fully up to the job. They had not been designed for a high-threat environment and were known to be vulnerable to IR-guided missiles and light antiaircraft guns, particularly at the suicidally low altitudes necessary for precise spraying. The aircraft's handling had always been tricky, so it was hard to fly close to the ground, under fire, in high-altitude valleys. The commercial windmill, ducts, and spray bars could not be well integrated with a high-wing, three-pod airframe. The needless extra drag of the resulting, compromise arrangement must have seriously hurt performance and further degraded the aircraft's handling. It was clearly only a matter of time before a Bronco would be lost. After at least one aircraft had a canopy shot out during a low-level run, State apparently enquired into the possibility of up-armoring the aircraft. But the real solution was a new airplane, something better suited to the peculiar operating environment of a drug-eradication aircraft."
Consider how much more robust and crash-worthy, and easy to maintain an armored fixed-wing crop duster would be compared to a fragile twin-tail
Bronco or mechanically complex helicopter...
* Available
* Can land operate fully loaded under 1000 feet dirt strips
* Excellent low-altitude maneuverability to fly NOE
* Definately could be used as MAS COP test surrogates
Initial climb rate: 8,440 ft/min
Maximum ferry range: 2,000 nautical miles
Mounts two 20 mm guns internal to the wing root structure
SIDEBAR: JATO for STOL and mini-runways to avoid enemy air base targeting, anyone?
SIDEBAR: JATO for STOL and mini-runways to avoid enemy air base targeting, anyone?
SINGAPORE
"I did the aircraft loss/damage analyses for SEA while working at WSEG. The A-4 had the best survivability rate for aircraft damaged from air defenses on missions into N. Vietnam. It came home to carriers on its damaged single J-52 when F-4s couldn't make it with damage to one of its J-79. The P&W J-52 was tough. Israeli A-4s flew with tailpipe extensions; the secret to taking damage from IR SAMs. IR SAMs are limited in warhead size. They love the AV-8 because: guess where the hot spot is?
<
